Concepts on Conception. An Epistemological Commentary by Boudon, Philippe
26 nordisk arkitekturforskning 1999:1              
”The hammering machine”, Manne Lodmark.
Boudon: Concepts on Conception             
Philippe Boudon
Concepts on Conception
An epistemological commentary
Recently published or presented research work on the theme of architectural design reveal highly varied approaches. Some derive from the huma-
nities and others, which are more epistemologically 
oriented, raise questions on the process itself. Still 
other approaches give priority to the analysis of the 
architectural object.
Italo Calvino tells us that the emperor of China 
had commissioned a drawing of a crab from an artist. 
The latter had laid down as a condition for carrying out 
his work that a villa with six servants should be made 
available to him for a year. After the year was over the 
emperor asked for the crab. The artist replied that he 
needed an additional six months under the same condi-
tions. Somewhat perpelexed, the emperor finally gave 
his approval though quite reluctantly. The six months 
over the emperor once again enquired, “where is my 
crab?” But there was still no crab to be seen; however, 
the artist then took a leaf of paper and proceeded on to 
draw the most beautiful crab that ever was.
Did the process of conception take a year and a half 
or merely ten minutes; should we be of the opinion 
that “conception” was involved in the above example? 
Could the conception not be limited equally to the few 
seconds concentration time required to spend the five 
minutes on the crab? And what’s more, hadn’t the artist 
“conceived” beforehand the idea that the villa with 
the accompanying servants would be necessary for 
the accomplishment of his task? Basically, this story 
is told by a writer; therefore a “conceiver”, if we are to 
agree with Herbert Simon,1 is a condensation of the 
different possible approaches to conception. 
Some are likely to say that conception is to be found 
in the drawing of the crab, an opinion which in the 
eyes of others involves somewhat a confusion bet-
ween conception and drawing! Some others will hold 
This article takes its point of departure in the seminar organized on 
April 2-3, 1992 by the Bureau de la recherche architecturale 
et le Plan construction et architecture au ministère de 
l’Equipement (The Office of Architectural Research and the Bureau 
for the Plan on Construction and Architecture of the Public Works 
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the view that conception was made possible (since the 
story served merely as a pretext for dealing with con-
ception) only due to the conditions under which the 
process of conception was able to unfold: a villa bring-
ing together a given number of actors seems to have 
been indispensable for the artist. Included among 
these actors we have an emperor, who commissions 
the work and from whom the artist manages to extract, 
all things considered, the price of a year and a half’s 
labour for a crab actually drawn in ten minutes. If we 
know that a ten-minutes wage would not have been 
on a par with the «most-beautiful-drawing-of-a-crab-
in-all-the-world», and if we consider that crab drawings 
commissioned by emperors are not a common occur-
rence, and that one must provide for one’s living in bet-
ween offers, what is to be, then, the cost of conception? 
For this is an issue which cannot be separated from the 
conditions surrounding the work of conception. Further-
more, wasn’t the year and a half of preparation a neces-
sary thing? Others still will opt for those moments im-
mediately preceding the drawing, on the assumption 
that the drawing could only begin after the artist has 
conceived some kind of generative outline even prior 
to his having placed the pencil on the paper. But in that 
case, the crab would have been conceived prior to its 
being drawn and the argument would be that there 
is just as much conception in and during the drawing 
even though you may not confuse the fact of drawing 
and conception.
But must we necessarily choose from among these 
different concepts on conception which the tale of the 
crab has brought to light? I would tend to think not so, 
on the basis of Karl Popper’s anti-essentialism. He wri-
tes: 
What counts is not so much the essence of things but rather 
the questions they ask and the problems they raise.2 
In this connection, research on the process of concep-
tion raises a good number of problems depending on 
which of the points of view mentioned above is adop-
ted, since in most likelihood each one is as legitimate 
as the next. It is evident that investigators focus their 
questions in relation to varying approaches which I 
shall now try to identify here.
There is a number of articles3, a few special issues pu-
blished by professional journals4, and a given amount 
of research work5, all show that architectural design 
is in the process of becoming an object of research. 
This trend follows up on hypotheses from scientific 
work dating back twenty years and relating not only to 
architectectural design6 but also to conception in ge-
neral7. The purpose of this article is to attempt to trace 
the diverse options, questions, and orientations that are 
a part of the emerging landscape of conception. We must 
however first ask ourselves what we mean by «conce-
ption». Some of the reflections concerning it belong 
naturally to conventional epistemological subdivi-
sions, but others show that conception imposes a re-
thinking of such a classification.
On the one hand we have existing disciplines which 
tend to take a classical point of view to approach the 
said object – conception – offering themselves in the 
process a new field of investigation. But at the same 
time they preserve their initial scientific object which, 
by definition, had originally constituted them as dis-
ciplines and which, therefore, is not conception itself. 
For example, such is the case of a recently launched re-
search activity entitled Euro-conception 8. This activity 
is concerned with the study of conception as a part of 
reflective professional activities; it seems to favour an 
approach that is predominantly sociological. Con-
ception provides a way to put together a body of know-
ledge on which, for instance, the sociologist will work.
On the other hand, we have some approaches postu-
lating that conception raises very specific problems for 
scientific research. The problems are of an epistemologi-
cal nature, they are new, and they are problems which 
existing disciplines have not been in a position to deal 
with so far as a result of the analytic approach which 
supposedly characterizes the classical sciences and 
which has prevented them from engaging this ob-
ject, conception, which as such is new for knowledge. 
This view is expressed by Jean-Louis Le Moigne9 when he 
proclaims: »Conception is a new idea.» This hypothesis, 
advanced by Herbert Simon and developed in France 
by J-L Le Moigne’s works leads us to what H. Simon calls 
the «Sciences of the Artificial»10, according to the title 
of his own work, or to the «sciences du génie» (the 
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engineering sciences), as proposed, in turn by J.-L. Le 
Moigne11. In both cases conception imposes an epis-
temological revision. These approaches share with ar-
chitecturology – the latter being their contemporary 
with respect to the emergence of its scientific project, 
as J.-L. Le Moigne observes – a concern for examining 
conception through the specificity of the problems it 
raises. Whereas the existing disciplines dealing with 
the exact sciences or with the humanities themselves 
offer conception as an additional new field of investi-
gation, without any consequent calling into question 
of their object: namely, the social for the sociologist, 
the economic for the economist, the mental for the 
psychologist; in short, the object without which the 
said disciplines would no longer be what they are all 
about. 
Conception as a field of study
If we may say so, this category deals with conception 
in the weak sense (and this does not diminish in any 
way the interest of the studies which this group under-
takes).
For example, Véronique Biau postulated, in an inte-
resting paper, that the process of conception, though 
concerned with the production of a building, is accom-
panied by an explanatory discourse that is produced 
at a social level since it reproduces “common themes” 
which basically go beyond the singularity of each buil-
ding. According to this researcher, the social dynamics 
taking place are re-interpreted in the architectural 
field and provide a framework within which individual 
answers by architects can be given. It is in such a man-
ner that a corpus of values is constituted. Such an obvi-
ously sociological approach12 leads, in spite of its social 
object which «by definition» goes somewhat beyond 
the limited field of architecture, to problems that are 
rather specific to the field of architecture and in a relati-
ve manner to other fields of investigation. Véronique 
Biau wonders whether there isn’t a contradiction ari-
sing between the ephemereal nature of value-oriented 
phenomena bringing about a rapid change to the exis-
ting corpus and the lasting nature of buildings which 
characterizes to a certain extent the architectural field. 
The outcome of it all is an object of questioning that is 
also focused and constitutes a true question proper to 
architectural research, even if the question arises in a 
more general problematic framework13.
Turning now to the expression “process” that Véro-
nique Biau uses, it should be noted that it encompas-
ses the degree of determination of conception that 
is based on sets of values affecting buildings. The 
“process” here is therefore approached through an 
anticipation of the evaluation of the architectural ob-
ject. From an epistemological point of view, I would 
not hesitate to say that what is produced here is a 
very clear object of study but which replaces what 
other researchers call, in turn, “process of concep-
tion” and which resides in the explanatory discourse 
addressing the building.
Which process of conception then are we speaking 
about? If we wish for archtitectural research to advan-
ce in a clear manner then it would be most appropriate 
to specify which one. The expression process of con-
ception might be attached to some kind of conceptual 
unit, or to some kind of essence... However let us admit 
that the expression must be seen in a relative manner. 
Should the meaning understood by Véronique not 
include what other researchers mean; that would not 
signify in the least that we must consider one interpre-
tation as “the good one” in oppostion to another.
Here then we are facing the inevitable variety of 
points of view from researchers on an object that will 
be individually constituted in fine according to the 
scientific and methodological approach of each re-
searcher. It seems to me that any essence of a process 
of conception that one would supposedly attempt to 
“discover”should be abandoned and care should be 
taken vis-à-vis the very expression process of concep-
tion, particularly if we consider that the supposed 
unity of its object is being called into question in the 
research activity that is taking place. Different objects 
of study are established from a supposedly unified and 
highly empirical object and, yet, we do not even know 
whether the said object – the process of conception 
– exists. Any reality that we might attribute to the pro-
cess of conception comes instead, once again, from the 
questions that it raises.
This is why Jacques Allegret expressed the hope 
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(since the proposition pertains to a possible project 
as opposed to actual work done on it) to analyse the 
process of conception with respect to which, in his 
view, too many interests seemed strongly inclined to 
preserve its mystery. He raised the initial problem of the 
methods to be used for such an analysis. The method 
would entail dealing with its most material aspects 
and would require a model and a rationale, namely, 
the architect’s building of a signature. This last activity 
would constitute the object of study for Jacques Alle-
gret. Although this proposal is part of a sociologically 
inspired approach, it is different nevertheless from 
Véronique Biau’s.
The above undertaking, which proposes to provide 
an account of the “fight for recognition”, belongs to a 
model of analysis of the process of production gover-
ned by three terms serving as framework for the areas 
of investigation: context (such as the competitions), 
facts (such as the commission), working environment 
(such as CAD or professional organization). The work of 
research would aim, as Allegret puts it, to discern what 
is at stake in the process of conception, what its driving 
forces are, and what possible determinants there may 
be.
Jacques Allegret gives a definition of conception: 
Architectural design results, to a large extent, from an 
objectifiable process, determined by decipherable con-
ditions, finalized by discernable issues, and conducted by 
agents with identifiable characteristics. 
Since the process is “as a rule socialized, interactive and 
negotiated”, Allegret attributes a small role to the desig-
ner “whose background must be known”, but he does 
not wish to “exaggerate that role because he seldom 
works alone”. For Allegret the reality of the process is 
primarily social and not immediately intelligible for 
the designers who would be playing their part as if 
they were blind actors.14
The main question which seems to emerge from 
the whole of investigations carried out on conception 
is that of knowing to what extent the researcher gives 
priority to a multiplicity of actors or to the individuality 
of the designer.15 We have here yet another reference to 
the object of research; however, it would be preferable 
for a clear, common understanding among the com-
munity of researchers in the field, that the scientific or 
methodological point of view adopted – inasmuch as 
priority would be given de facto to one position or the 
other – would not be blown out of proportion so much 
that it would become more than a methodological 
point of view, and would thus pretend to be giving an 
account of «the» reality of the process of conception.
Michel Routon’s work also has to be classified in 
the category of sociologically inspired research. He 
uses Lakoff and Johnson’s writings which have establi-
shed the role that the metaphor can play beyond lang-
uage pertaining to our concepts and our experiences. 
From this perspective, architectural design seems to de-
rive from a cognitive semantic approach as an 
instance that participates in the building of social enti-
ties, as well as in determining their nature and in their 
adjustment to the present times. 
The “applicationism” of the method (the intention of 
applying both the methods and the objectives of know-
ledge of a given discipline to the field of architecture16) 
involves the transposition of the mentioned writings 
into architecture. Thus we see that the terms architec-
ture and architectural conception are interchangeable, 
thereby confirming that the approach can be placed 
in the category described above, as a weak hypothesis 
concerning the use of the term conception. It is nonet-
heless true that apparently peripheral approaches can 
deal with conception in the strong sense and that the 
role played by the metaphor at the very center of the 
architect’s work can be examined. Needless to say, the 
attempt at classification that I am carrying out for the 
sake of clarity, must not lead to fixed categories since the 
trans-disciplinary bridges can indeed provide an impe-
tus for research. In this way we may move from the so-
ciological to cognitivism and then to the semantic.
On this occasion Hélène Mialet’s approach came clo-
ser to anthropology and even more to cognition than 
to sociology. In her presentation she raised the ques-
tion of knowing how a new scientific theory is concei-
ved. From a methodological perspective the question 
related to how one can carry out the observation of the 
mind in the process of conceiving a new idea. Using 
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as a starting point writings by epistemologists and of 
historians of the sciences, Mialet presented laboratory 
observations in biotechnology and thermodynamics, 
as is done with anthropological work linked to the 
emergence of scientific, technical, and cultural ob-
jects. Invention in architecture is then postulated as being 
accounted for by an approach analogous to the one 
within the scientific fields.
Here we see that the idea of conception is assimila-
ted to that of invention. Although no reference is made 
to it, it is in what I will call the Simonian paradigm of the 
focus on conception in general that I would rank this 
work. However, the approach itself claims to be anthro-
pological, subject to better understanding that which 
would bring together – or distinguish – conception and 
invention. This is why Hélène Miallet’s remarks seem to 
me to fall under the approaches classified as cognitive. 
Conception is not dealt with as a specific object nor is 
it seen as a place to situate a specific problem. ”Con-
ception” is reduced to “invention”, with the latter being 
relegated to the “conditions” under which it emerges 
in the laboratories17. The question raised concerns the 
assimilation of conception to terms that appear to be 
close to it. The terms would call for further specification 
of the degree of assimilation they go through or, on the 
contrary, further explanation on the distinction sepa-
rating conception from invention, in the present case, 
or, also just as well, from decision, from representation, 
and probably from other terms as well. Unless we are 
cautious, we might accidentally hesitate to amalgamate 
conception, decision, representation similarly to how 
we can amalgamate conception and invention. To de-
sign an architectural object is indeed, by the same stro-
ke, to invent it through its representation as well as to 
decide its future existence. But these different aspects 
of the process do not become consequently assimila-
ted to each other.
We must point out here how much the very idea of 
conception upsets acquired mental habits and to what 
extent it is, to take up again J.-L. Le Moigne’s expres-
sion, “a new idea”. Philippe Deshayes has made a pre-
sentation18 showing how Alvar Aalto encountered the 
specificity of architectural conception when he raised 
the apparently astonishing question of the influence 
of architecture on the materials, had had to give up the 
idea for failure in making explicit the question, due to 
the absence of a modelling that would allow him to 
specify his question. Aalto was then forced to conclu-
de his remarks in a much more conventional manner 
referring to «the influence... of the materials on archi-
tecture»! P. Deshayes concluded from the above that, 
as a result of a truly theoretical work not being achie-
ved, the designer cannot take advantage of modelling 
tools capable of allowing him to make headway in his 
capactiy to reflect on the process of design, which cor-
responds to the aim of architecturology.
Thus, we move on to an entirely different paradigm 
which serves as a framework for the work of researchers 
whose view of conception is that of a bona fide object 
as opposed to one limiting it only to a kind of  black 
box over which are enacted a number of influences 
to be discovered, and under conditions to be exami-
ned and possibly undergoing determinations exterior 
to it, to be analysed. The object in question emerges 
in Aalto’s text and his failed attempt at description, 
as analysed by P. Deshayes. The same object is being 
timidly aimed at by Le Corbusier in his board with 
four compositions. But in those two cases the architect 
has – in terms of conception – only already designed 
objects. and the difficulty lies in thinking out the act 
of conception without thinking it in terms of designed 
objects. Such a process, moreover, is in contradiciton 
with the very idea of conception since conceiving is con-
ceiving “that which does not yet exist ”19.
Conceoption as an object of science
In contrast with the above-mentioned researchers who 
tend to apply to architecture approaches belonging to 
disciplines outside its field, others aim at something 
specific behind the word conception although, here 
once again, it does not always involve the same thing. I 
should specifiy that referring to such and such a disci-
pline does not necessarily mean that an applicationist 
approach is being used. An example of this is Domini-
que Raynaud’s doctoral work which he has placed in 
the context of an anthropological approach to the 
imaginary20, but which also leads him to engage the 
double point of view of cognitive psychology and an-
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thropology. By setting up his object of research on the 
side of the emergence of the «parti», he is aiming at 
a question which according to him has been formerly 
raised by architecturology21. He is seeking to find out to 
what extent the «parti» (that evident moment of the 
design process thus named by the Ecole des beaux-
arts and which is fashionably referred to nowadays as 
«concept») relies on the association of mental ima-
ges and dynamic schemata, all of which leads him to 
raise a major question: «How does the architectural 
form retain the semantic properties of the image?» 
From an anthropological perspective, Raynaud evo-
kes the sociological «implications» of the «breakdown 
of mytho-symbolic systems in modern societies». We 
find ourselves, indeed, in the midst of cross-discipli-
narity while coming as close as possible to one core 
element of architecture since the parti raises a primary 
question for design in architecture. But however cen-
tral this question may be it nevertheless channels the 
author almost necessarily towards a history of archi-
tectural symbology and a type of anthropology. As we 
see here, resorting or referring to established discipli-
nes takes as its starting point, just the same, both con-
ception itself and the questions it raises, but we do not 
find ourselves in what I have called applicationism. And 
it is in the closest proximity to conception and at the 
place for an architecturological question that the veer 
to anthropology imposes itself 22.
Although put differently, this very same question 
was formulated by J.-C. Burdese, G. Engrand, and J.-F. 
Mabardi. The authors are opposed to the holistic and 
methodology-oriented vision of the architect’s “work 
process”, which in their view prevails today (including 
the vision of the corresponding phases leading to the 
object) – a vision that is, in fact, widespread. They 
make a distinction between two radically different 
intellectual working attitudes which relate to qua-
si-antithetical investment modes on the part of the 
conceiving subject. They postulate a radical distinction 
between conception (common to all subjects) and 
“projectation” (specific to the architect): If we go back 
to the crab metaphor, it seems to me that, for the 
authors, the crab would have been conceived before 
the artist’s drawing projected it onto the paper. Or, bet-
ter yet, its «generative figure», which will give way to 
the drawing, will probably have been coming to ma-
turity at length before revealing itself suddenly, in a 
manner that made it possible for the drawing of the 
crab to emerge.
These authors recall the former questions on the 
double verbal and iconic aspect of the process as a way 
to emphaize the two-tiered work of conception which 
pertains to both image and thought. The authors refer 
to G. Bachelard through an excellent example of the 
word “conception” (the verb “to conceive” would ex-
press tension between “to perceive” and “concept”) 
and thereby raise an obviously crucial question for the 
investigations on architectural conception23.
Moreover, in spite of the “intuitive” nature of the 
question they raise and which they consider to be 
“fragmented” and “lying beyond their capacity to de-
monstrate”, the authors deal with a real problem, na-
mely the foundational figure, although they address it 
in a different manner than does Dominique Raynaud. 
The two resulting approaches can appear quite com-
plementary to each other, one more anthropological 
and the other more cognitivist. For the three authors, 
“the objective of conception is to contain the entire 
project within a foundational figure”. Although the ap-
proaches are different, the question is indeed the same 
and marks a major development with respect to the 
queries generated by conception. Having recourse to 
the varying points of view of given disciplines should 
not overshadow the apparently specific character of 
the question raised by conception, at the very point 
where the process begins. That question is referred to, 
in still another manner, by architecturology when the 
latter, in turn, calls it the question of its initiation24. In 
this case, architecturology is aiming at the question 
of how to begin the project, as opposed to any idea(s) 
that may be at the origin of the project,which raises an 
entirely different question.
Though in the preceding case the idea of a genera-
tive figure seems to be based on a specificity of the work 
of conception in architecture, for other investigators 
the activity of conception is, from the outset, assumed 
to be an activity that is common to all subjects. Thus 
for André Demailly it becomes an object for the psy-
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chologist or the cognitician. Linking architecture here 
to the sciences of the artificial in a manner similar to H. 
Simon’s approach25, Demailly proposes to focus on the 
knowledge of architecture – and of its improvement – 
through the establishment of «organizational artificial 
memories». Such memories would be capable of re-
producing the differed mnesic processing of informa-
tion. Here architecture is associated to a part of reality 
«understood as a hierarchical organization of systems 
that are both autonomous and functionally interde-
pendent». I believe that it is important to note here 
that this paper, presented by a connoisseur of Herbert 
Simon’s works, basically approaches architecture as 
a process of conception which becomes now exte-
rior to the architect’s design work and acts instead as an 
aid to decision. The matter of knowing whether con-
ception and decision should be assimilated or not is 
raised again here in the same manner as it was, before, 
with regard to the couple conception/invention. On a 
different scale, we shall note in relating to the general 
institutional situation of architecture how daring André 
Demailly’s proposal is and, consequently, how thought 
provoking is his proposal. 
We know how much Robert Prost26 considers it ne-
cessary «to extend the notion of project» to areas of in-
vestigation whose study would contribute to a better 
understanding of the processes involved in architec-
tural design. The project is but a link in more general 
processes extending beyond the design in a temporal 
context both upstream and downstream. At the semi-
nar, Prost’s intervention questioned the evidence on the 
basis of which the «architectural project» could serve 
as the «place for the possible generation of knowled-
ge of conception».27 Three crucial elements emerge 
through the above question: the diversity of empirical 
terrains covered by the notion of project in architectu-
re, the protocols of observation, and the conditions for 
validation of the elements of knowledge produced. The 
question is also of major importance for knowledge on 
conception since the latter tends to go beyond the in-
tuitive knowledge of conception supposedly natural 
to the designer or the architect. How is one to produce 
knowledge on conception? That is the singular question 
that is raised here. The question now falls under the 
category of a «strong» meaning attributed to concep-
tion insofar as the approach calls for investigating what 
kind of possible special device would allow the produc-
tion of knowledge on the subject matter. It is for this 
reason that the project itself is being investigated. Ro-
bert Prost’s work is interesting because it seems to ac-
cept jointly, with respect to conception, the projectual 
dimension of conception – understood as that which 
pertains to the project – (even though the latter is not 
able to produce its own knowledge), and the proces-
sual dimension to indicate that which pertains to pro-
cedural knowledge, which is more greatly emphasized 
by the author. The latter is fundamentally different from 
an object-focused knowledge of architecture on 
which architects tend to concentrate exclusively. Alt-
hough valid and comprehensible their outlook, which 
is encouraged by a professional bias in which all is re-
duced to the architectural object, it is restrictive since 
it overshadows the processual dimension.
All of the above leads us to a consideration of a third 
type of research work that I shall now introduce as a 
complement to the two preceeding approaches and 
which renders a central role to the architectural object, 
as opposed to the project, in the study of conception.
The architectural or spatial object  as conception
The very idea of conception in the view of some resear-
chers, is closely linked to the conceived object. In 
other words, conception is linked to the architectural 
object that in itself constitutes the finality of concep-
tion.28 The conception that some have of the object 
counts as much, if not more, than the design through 
which the object is made, whether by an individual 
designer or a team of actors. Among other researchers 
however, conception is not rejected, they instead opt 
for pursuing their investigation into the object through 
their specific methodological point of view.
This explains the primary role that morphology plays 
in the work done by the team of researchers consisting 
of Bernard Deloche, Patick Denis and Bernard Duprat. 
The group is interested in understanding morphologi-
cal phenomena as specific products of the processes 
of conception, the starting point of which is the “plastic 
schema” defined as “the generating principle to be for-
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malized as a set of rules of production”. To put it graphi-
cally, these researchers are working towards a person-
nal grammar for the designer which can be expressed by 
formal rules. Their approach aims beyond the specifics 
of architecture so that it can be applied to artistic ac-
tivities, an area in which their method has already been 
used. What is taken into account are the traits of a given 
object in its final form in an attempt to classify the forms 
produced by the architect, and then, through another 
operation, to retrace the process that produced those 
forms.
Albert Lévy also places the architectural object and 
its space at the center of a knowledge of conception. 
He emphasises architectural space in combination 
with references to the architecturological approach, at 
times highlighted by him and which he contrasts with 
other approaches. According to Lévy a theory of archi-
tectural design must also be a theory of architectural 
space 29 in order «to form, in his terms, a general com-
prehensive theory».30 For Lévy architectural space is a 
polysemic, signifying structure31, a stratified complex 
structure, the product of a generative process. Thus 
he proposes a «model of the process of conception» 
distinguishing syntax and semantics from content 
and expression  while opposing performance and com-
petence.  This applicationist technique – to the extent 
that it is part of a more semiotic approach – establishes 
a distinction, which merits attention, between gene-
ral architectural competence and design competen-
ce, leading to a hypothetical definition of architectural 
design. The preceding would correspond to a media-
tion which transfers the space of general competence 
through design competence.
Thus, Architectural space becomes a stratified 
complex structure, a product of a generative process32, 
and a polysemic signifying structure. We recognize 
here the double axis for process and system in which 
lies the intention to re-introduce architectural space as 
a system, in relation to the generative one on which 
architecturology has thus far concentrated its work. 
But it is still necessary to better specify what is to be 
understood under «design competence» if one is to 
integrate it into the structure of the signification of 
architectural space.
A. Lévy strongly emphasizes the necessity of not confus-
ing generativity and genesis (taken to mean “continu-
ous linear development”), thereby joining Burdèse’s 
team in their critique of such a development. The team 
of  O. Délépine, D. Jézequellou and F. Sotinel consi-
ders that the process follows an approach for forma-
lization of the project that is “increasingly refined”. The 
process of conception would consist of a system cha-
racterized by nondetermination and by relations of 
components to the whole that may take place either 
in an ascending or a descending mode. Through the 
work that the group has carried out on this computeri-
zed process, they have attributed a “declarative” and an 
“imperative” mode to each of the above patterns.
Both expressions, ascending and descending pat-
tern33, are proof that something is progressing, indeed, 
and that the process, viewed as a totality by the resear-
chers fundamentally consists of a progression. What is 
original about this group’s work is that on the one hand 
it considers nondetermination as being permanent 
and that, on the other hand, it thinks out the process 
– and the nondetermination accompanying it – within 
the context of an ultimate objective which remains at 
all times a part of architectural space itself, considered 
holistically. Its characterization could be summed up in 
two key words: nondetermination and totality.34
The place of the spatial object is once again under 
scrutiny through the work of Alain Rénier, who intro-
duces an additional object of study by contrasting 
two types of morphologies for the spatial object.35 
The first proceeds from a physical or formal reality. 
The second may be constituted from representations 
and projections carried out as imaginary and they 
give rise to manifest spatial organizations which are 
distinct from the first group and are formally recogni-
zable through experimental research. In contrast with 
the fragments of the first type, which proceed from a 
morphological analysis of the consitituent physical 
components, Rénier distinguishes the segments 
which proceed from reading and from perception. 
The recognition of the difference between the two 
should lead to a reconsideration of views on the pro-
cess of the conception of space. The author is particu-
larly interesred in the organization of complex places 
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and of their users. If there is a process going on here, it 
is related not so such to the project’s elaboration as it 
is with the meaning that the spatial object acquires 
through this process and which should be taken into 
account in the elaboration of the project. The spe-
cific instance taken here does not belong to the pro-
gramme nor to the elaboration per se of the project. 
Rather, it is the moment devoted to the recognition 
of that which founds the existence of the «working 
stuff» of the project, beyond its emergence through the 
interplay of the ’s design.
The goal is to recognize the structuring modes of 
the mental space. Once again, the use of the term pro-
cess, as used by Alain Rénier and compared with the 
preceeding group’s use, does not carry the same mea-
ning. We are in no way dealing with alternatives but 
rather with approaches to differing objects of know-
ledge whose subsequent possible mutual articulation 
cannot be excluded. In fact, the very newness of the 
field of study of conception renders this type of situa-
tion quite normal.
To conclude with Gilbert Luigi, the archtiectural ob-
ject is such an intricate part of the process leading to 
it that, according to this architect, in an unpublished 
report on 20th century sculpture and architecture, 
sculpture functions as a model of conception for 
some architects of the present century. His method is 
based on observation of the morphological changes 
evidenced in the designer’s drawings.
Lastly, J.-Y. Quay’s intervention, which was more archi-
tectural, came closer to adopting a process instead of 
giving an account of it. We find here the defendable 
position of the archtiect who is aiming primarily at the 
object to be designed.
In these two cases, what counts most is the distinc-
tion between a reference to the forms as such and a 
submersion of the latter in processes charged with 
meaning and to which they belong as elements in a 
process of meaning, as described by Alain Rénier. Gi-
ven autonomous or sculptural forms, or components 
of the process of meaning, provide us an important al-
ternative to the approaches on architectural design at 
the very level of the spatial object.
In conclusion
It is clear that the complexity and variety of problems 
do not lend themselves to a neat and organized ar-
rangement fitting in with the classification attempts 
I have made here in order to make the reader more 
aware of the situation. Probably due to its newly emer-
ging nature, their object of knowledge is naturally still 
seeking to organize itself into epistemologically rele-
vant and scientifically oriented sectors. The distinction 
which I have made does not prevent the two sectors 
from establishing links for a two-way collaboration later 
on.36 The highly varied presentations and the number 
of questions raised tend to treinforce the urgency of 
investigations on architectural conception. To take up 
an expression used not long ago by Michel Conan.37 
However difficult it may have been to transcribe tho-
roughly the wealth of papers and debates at the semi-
nar, it is possible to attempt to situate the papers pre-
sented and to classify a certain number of questions.
Process, on the one hand, and conception, on the 
other, can refer to different objects. In the case of pro-
cess it can be envisaged as close as possible to or at the 
very heart of the architect’s work. It can also pertain 
to a type of research which for lack of a better term I 
might qualify as cognitive in nature. But from another 
point of view it can involve the consideration of the 
interplay of actors who are concerned by conception. 
We are faced here with the ambivalence of the term 
conception which, as J.-L. Le Moigne underlined, can 
apply both to the activity (meaning 1) as well as the re-
sult (meaning 2). This means that the conception that 
one has vis-à-vis an expected result and the activity 
that leads to such a result through an action involving 
conception are two different things.38
Thus, one of the most difficult obstacles for investiga-
tions on conception is precisely that of trying to remain 
as lucid as possible on this difference. This is demon-
stratedly so when we have research work such as Alain 
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Rénier’s which, while focusing on conception under 
meaning 2,postulates a process that happens to be 
semiotic. So although it may appear natural to see 
behind the term conception meaning 1 – the process 
– there are researchers nevertheless (A. Lévy and A. 
Rénier)39 who postulate, quite rightly, that this time 
conception, from the semiotic point of view, may un-
der meaning 2, be apprehended in terms of process... 
This is why several researchers have joined in with the 
criticism expressed by J.-C. Burdèse, G. Engrand, and 
J.-F. Mardi concerning a linear vision of a process that 
is progressively advancing from the imprecise to the 
precise. And little does it matter whether one’s repre-
sentation of the advancement is made in terms of the 
conventional succession of tasks (programme, outline, 
preliminary drawings, etc.), of the progressive reduc-
tion of uncertainty,40 or through some mathematical or 
automatic model for the sequence of operations.41
Such a degree of complexity calls for continuing 
the work undertaken but with the hope that the inves-
tigations will not be perceived as too basic in nature, 
in comparison with the traditional image of a creative 
and comprehensive act in the fine arts tradition, but 
which corresponds to an image that Jacques Allegret 
has quite rightly attempted to demystify. Research will 
gain little by perpetuating such a mystery; this is even 
more true for education. In this regard, the great stride 
accomplished at this seminar will have consisted in 
establishing conception as an object of research and, 
to unbolt the complexity hovering over the too empi-
rical and general term project.42 For this term project 
reaches the same degree of generality that could 
be attributed to the human body in medecine. Thus, 
who would consider re-focusing medical studies on the 
human body? or to devote one’s research activities on 
the human body? With conception, epistemologically 
speaking, the question is raised at another level which 
would correspond perhaps – to continue with the ana-
logy in biology – to the realm of the living, an entirely 
different matter.
As for the different objects identified by researchers 
we might consider that they might be orienting archi-
tectural research towards more precise questions, as 
it would be done with the nervous or blood circulation 
systems. How could their inter-relation have been con-
sidered as part of the human body if they had not been 
previously distinguished, for the human body, from a 
biological perspective, is but a storage-room, as is the 
project.
Philippe Boudon
Notes
1. We know that according to Herbert Simon the architect 
who conceives a building, the musician who conceives 
a symphony, the engineer conceiving a motor are all 
“conceivers” and as such they bring into play a cognitive 
activity apt to being laid down as object of knowledge 
by the sciences of the artificial: cf. H. Simon. Sciences de 
ses systèmes, sciences de l’artificiel (1969). Paris. Dunod. 
1991. 
2. K. Popper. La quête inachevée. Paris. Calman-Lévy. 1974.
3. M. Conan, Concevoir un projet d’architecture. Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 1991; R. Prost, Conception architecturale, 
une investigation méthodologique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 
1992; Philippe Boudon, Introduction à l’architecturologie, 
Paris, Dunod, 1992.
4. Technique et Architecture (Paris), N°406, février–mars 
1993. Particularly the articles by R. Prost qnd J. Sau-
tereau. The other articles in this issue do not really take 
into account the distinction project/conception.
5. As evidenced by the consultations undertaken by the 
Plan on Construction and Architecture, as well as by the 
Office of Architectural Research (MELT) on the theme 
“Knowledge on Conception”. 
6. C. Alexander, Notes sur la synthèse de la forme, Paris, 
Dunod, 1967; P. Boudon, Sur l’espace architectural, es-
sai d’épistémologie de l’architecture, Paris, Dunod, 1971, 
and M. Conan, op. cit. p. 5. M. Conan wrote the following 
with respect to the proposal made in the name of archi-
tecturology to constitute architectural design as an ob-
ject of knowledge: “The knowledge of architecture does 
not limit itself to the knowledge of the ‘real’, the ‘concrete’ 
space, which is the realm of perception. Such knowledge 
extends to conception. For architecturology, the facts 
are not limited only to the material aspect of the archi-
tectural work.” (La Pensée, 1972);at that time adherence 
to the distinction project/conception was still maintai-
ned, as shown by C.-H. Rocquet who reporting on my 
work Richelieu, ville nouvelle, answered the question 
“what is architecturology?” thus: “that which consists of 
giving more attention to the project than to the finished 
work.”
7. H. Simon, op. cit. The meeting between researchers on 
architectural design and researchers on conception took 
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place in 1986. Jean-Louis Le Moigne is quoted in the pro-
ceedings from a symposium devoted to Herbert Simon: 
“Philippe Boudon’s contribution ... is particularly welco-
med as an illustration of our remarks since it specifies the 
intellectual path that leads the architect reflecting on his 
activity (as opposed to his art) to invent  ... a theoretical 
basis of conception.”
8. Euro-conception. European Programme for Research 
and Experimentation. Practices and arts in architectural, 
construction and urbanistic design. The 1992 Plan for 
Construction and Architecture, The joining together 
of investigation on fields as heterogeneous as archi-
tecture, construction, and urbanism illustrate well the 
general nature of such work.
9. J. L. Le Moigne, Théorie du système général. Paris. P.U.F., 
1977. Revised in 1990.
10. H. Simon op. cit.
11. J.-L. Le Moigne. op.cit.
12. The approach takes its inspiration from Bourdieu’s 
sociological theories.
13. Véronique Biau sees quite rightly a complementary ap-
proach between hers, which deals with fashion, and 
architecturology’s, which, as a theory, aims at the gene-
ral as opposed to the passing phenomenon.
14. But how are we to appreciate the necessarily intentional 
part without which the “building of a signature” could 
not take place?
15. This point of view which I expressed during the introduc-
tion to the seminar coincides with the distinction esta-
blished by R. Prost in an article which the reader might 
find useful “conception : où en est la recherche” (Concep-
tion: An Update on Research) in Technique et Architec-
ture (Paris) N° 406 -fécvrier/mars 1993. It is interesting to 
note on this subject that Robert Prost places “the work” 
on the side of the actors (and “the project” on the side of 
the architect), whereas Véronique Biau places the work 
on the side of the “architect”. Here we have a question to 
work on.
16. Cf. P. Boudon, “Recherche fondamentale en architec-
ture”, in Architecture et comportement (Lausanne), vol. 
5, n°3, 1989.
17. In this manner we would have under this category 
other researchers coming from the field of architecture 
and placing themselves also on the side of conception 
in general. In architecture we should draw lessons from 
what is taking place outside itself and in other fields as 
regards invention or discovery.
18. The papers that I am describing here were presented in 
the group “theory”, where I served as moderator. P. Des-
hayes’ presentation took place in the group dealing with 
the theme “the practice”. The third group worked on the 
theme “education”. Those readers interested in the two 
other groups would have to consult the proceedings of 
the seminar for the corresponding papers. 
19. I am borrowing this quotation of Plautus from J.-L Le 
Moigne as an illustration of the architecturological pro-
position that says that “the building is the representation 
of the project that preceded it and not the opposite”, cf. P. 
Boudon, op. cit.
20. In the spirit of Gilbert Durand’s works.
21. Cf. D. Raynaud, L’imagination architecturale, Doctoral 
thesis. Université de Sciences Sociales de Grenoble. Re-
search centre on the imaginary. «(P. Boudon) recognizes 
that «the parti could provide a line of research for archi-
tecturology’ but he never attributes a central role to it... 
the scale as such is but an instrument for concretizing 
the initial parti... the central problem for architecturology 
is that of investigating architectural partis, their origin, 
and their transformation.» 
22. As an example, see the interesting article by D; Raynaud, 
“Symbolisme de la porte” in Architecture et comporte-
ment (Lausanne), vol. 8, 1992.
23. Such a question requires a better understanding of the 
role that drawing in figuration plays for the architect. The 
reader can consult the following on the subject:J.-C. Leha-
bar, Le dessin d’architecte, Marseille, Parenthèses, 1983; 
P. Boudon and F. Pousin, Figures de la conception archi-
tecturale, Dunod, 1986; a series of works subsequently 
undertaken by North Americans on this subject and 
which M. Conan has conveniently inventoried, op. cit.
24. Let us note that the opposition between project and con-
ception on which the authors insist becomes somewhat 
blurred if one were to ask whether the idea of concep-
tion is not closely related to the idea of “project”. Isn’t 
then the foundational figure an instance, however sing-
ular, that is nevertheless an instance of the project? But 
we distinguish the above opposition from the question 
of the initiating of conception. 
25. Cf. H. Simon, op. cit.
26. R. Prost, Conception architecturale, une investigation 
méthodologique, op. cit.
27. Today the question is up for debate if we consider the 
teaching of architecture. There would be reason to have 
great concern over the capacity for an education in ar-
chitecture that is “focused on the project”, as it is reques-
ted, to fulfill the function of teaching efficiently. Mistrust 
of the capacity of the project to produce its own know-
ledge does not prevent us, inversely, from envisaging 
that knowledge of conception and its processes will lead 
to an alternative training for the project. See R. Hoddé’s 
paper, Apprivoiser la complexité:de la connaissance des 
processus de conception à l’apprentissage du projet 
(Taming complexity: from the knowledge of the proces-
ses of conception to the apprenticeship of the project) 
the title of which is indicative of the objective to im-
prove education on design through the advancement 
of knowledge. 
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28. In this connection, the distinction introduced by architec-
turology between the conceived object and the concep-
tion of the object explains the need for a displacement 
from the architectural space towards the space of con-
ception imposing itself.
29. It is true that archtiecturology’s hypothesis establishing 
as an object of knowledge a space of conception that 
is distinct from the architectural space (space that it has 
in modelling in the meantime)transforms the latter into 
an object of knowledge also. This does not exclude the 
possibility of taking architectural space into considera-
tion. But A. Levy’s hypothesis consists of re-integrating 
the architectural space, originally set aside by architec-
turology, into the projected object of knowledge.
30. The point of view here is not only different from but also op-
posed to architecturology’s since the latter does not aim 
at a theory of architecture or even of architectural design. 
Rather, architecturology focuses on precise questions, 
such as the question of measurement.
31. This is not denied by the architecturological point of 
view. But in order to articulate a knowledge of concep-
tion effectively into the architectural space, the former 
would need to have been further developed. The at-
tempt to do so seems premature to us.
32. It should be noted that the author insists vigorously on 
the need not to confuse generativity and genesis which 
is taken to mean “continuous linear development”.
33. The descending methods proceed through successive 
refinements and the breaking of problems into sub-pro-
blems down to elementary operations; the ascending 
patterns proceed through building of new systems ori-
ginating from a combination of pre-defined elements. 
34. On this subject the authors make an important remark 
on the present state of experimentation:as a place for 
experimentation the field of knowledge of archtitecture 
can always rely at worst on education.
35. Let us note carefully that the author does not refer to 
“architectural object”.
36. Thus, M. Conan writes:”Architectural design perhaps 
offers a priviledged area for establishing links between 
specialists in the social sciences and specialists in the sci-
ence of the artificial. In any case, the latter will need to 
rely on the refined description on the process of archi-
tectural conception. But such a connection requires 
that a basic knowledge of it be developed, combined 
with the corresponding language that will allow for its 
description. Such is the aim of architecturology”, in Archi-
tecture et comportement (Lausanne) Vol. 5, N° 3, 1989. 
(Translator’s note: Philippe Boudon has agreed to my 
use of “design” at the beginning of this paragraph and 
“conception” at the end. According to him, the above 
ambivalence indicates what is at stake for scientific re-
search as regards the underlying proximity and diffe-
rence between these two terms ; the same would apply 
to the terms “projet”, “projettazione”, and “projetation” as 
well as “drawing” and “intention”. 
37. Ibid
38. Even when they proceed from a conjunction of events.
39. The underlying influence of Hjelmslev should probably 
be taken into account to explain this folding back of the 
system over the process.
40. For a critique of the process of conception understood 
as a linear progression from the imprecise to the precise, 
see: F. Schatz, S Fiszer. “Histoires et mesures de projets”, 
in De l’architecture à l’épistemologie, la question de 
l’échelle (under the direction of P. Boudon) Paris, PUF, 
1991.
41. I myself had referred to a possible parallel with geometric 
orders as a possible model for representation of a process 
for architectural conception at a time where the objec-
tive was to suggest possible pathways for interrogation 
in architecturology. But it’s been a long time since the 
latter abandoned the idea of a comprehensive represen-
tation of the process and opted for the investigation of 
local operations. 
42. The distinction between project and conception in-
volves work that cannot be summarized in a few lines. 
Kindly see my article “Conception et projet” in the work 
L’Architecte et le philosophe under the direction of Anto-
nia Soulez, Bruselles, Mardaga, 1993.
